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DIALOGUE OCTOBER, 1978 
MARXISM AND BEHAVIORISM: IDEOLOGICAL PARALLELS 
Stephen Foster 
Western Michigan University 
Marxism, as a philosophical system, 
attempts to provide an accurate an-
alysis of man and his social institu-
tions. Behaviorism, as a system of psy-
chology, claims that its method is 
fundamental to an understanding of 
human nature. Both systems justify 
their claims on the grounds that they 
are employing methods which are sci-
entific in character. Marxism bases its 
method on historical analysis, maintain-
ing that history unfolds in an orderly, 
predictable manner and that a proper 
analysis of it reveals scientific laws. 
The general methodology of the nat-
ural sciences is the model for behavior-
ism. Behaviorists point to the successes 
of the natural sciences and claim that 
they employ the scientific method thor-
oughly and more consistently than any 
previous or current psychology. More-
over, they claim that behavioristic psy-
chology has been mindful of and faith-
ful to the scientific goals of predicta-
bility and control of the subject matter 
and has advanced the study of human 
psychology to the extent that it can 
call itself objective and genuinely sci-
entific. 
My use of the term "Marxism" in 
this paper will refer to the thought and 
writings of Karl Marx and Fredrich 
Engels. I will take B. F. Skinner to be 
the principal representative of behav-
iorism. It is my contention that both 
Marxism and behaviorism as complete 
views of man (which they both claim 
to be) are forms of dogmatic ideology. 
I take the term "ideology" generally as 
the Oxford English Dictionary defines 
it "ideal or abstract speculation; in a 
deprecatory sense, unpractical or vision-
ary theorizing or speculation." I would 
emphasize the term "visionary" in this 
definition and apply it to both Marxism 
and behaviorism to emphasize the fact 
that both systems extend their visions 
into political programs, that is, both 
envisage their systems as potential so-
cial systems which vastly improve hu-
man conditions. 
I take the term "ideology" specifical-
ly to apply to a system of thought in 
which the political dimension is con-
nected to the whole system in such a 
way that it serves as a moral postulate 
for the entire system and, in effect, 
closes it off such that to question the 
presuppositions is to betray vital moral-
political purpose. While this character-
ization has long been conceded by many 
to be true of Marxism (we frequently 
hear of Marxist ideology) it has not 
been widely extended to the system of 
behaviorism. Yet I believe that behav-
iorism suffers from a similar flaw, one 
in which a methodological rigidity is 
tied to a social theory and as a conse-
quence inhibits the development of 
creative intellectual activity. 
I propose to examine Marxist and 
behaviorist thinking and draw what I 
think are significant parallels. I shall 
do this by developing three separate 
points: 
(I) Marxism and behaviorism as 
sciences 
(II) Marxism and behaviorism as 
social philosophies 
(III) Marxism and behaviorism as 
ideologies. 
I 
Marxism claims to apply a scientific 
method to the study of social phenom-
ena. The method employed is one de-
veloped by Hegel, who attempted to 
account for human social development 
by interpreting it to a process of dia-
lectical assent. He believed that the 
natural world, including human soci-
ety, was a phenomenal manifestation 
out of which the Ideal (the rational 
essence of reality) develops to a state 
of perfect self-realization through a se-
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ries of contradictions whose resolutions 
advance the development and status of 
the Ideal to its perfect state.1 
Marx adopted this method and modi-
fied it. He criticized Hegel for abstract-
ing the content out of his philosophy, 
attempting to account for reality in a 
wholly abstract fashion, imputing con-
tent and meaning to a purely ideation-
al realm while failing to recognize the 
substance and effect of material reality.2 
Marx and Engels applied Hegel's 
method to social-economic history. They 
were convinced that the real content 
of history was located in economic de-
velopment and that this development 
took place in the form of class struggle: 
It was seen that all past history with the 
exception of its primitive stages, was the 
history of class struggles: that these war-
ring classes are always products of the 
modes of production and exchange, in a 
word, of the economic conditions of their 
time; that the economic structure of society 
always furnishes the real basis starting from 
which we can alone work out the ultimate 
explanation of the whole superstructure of 
judicial and political institutions as well 
as of the religious, philosophical and other 
ideas of a given historical period.3 
The science of man for Marx and En-
gels is economics interpreted in an his-
torical context. This science provides, 
they maintain, what we today expect 
from any legitimate scientific disci-
pline, predictability. Human history is 
subject to the rule of laws as is the 
natural material world. "He (Darwin) 
dealt the metaphysical conception of 
nature the heaviest blow by his proof 
that all organic beings, plants, animals 
and man himself are products of a proc-
ess of evolution going on through mil-
lions of years."4 A study of history re-
veals the social economic laws to which 
mankind is subject. Thus the future 
course of human social events can be 
charted and predicted once the his-
torical laws are understood. Marx 
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comes to see his efforts as a genuine 
contribution to the study of human af-
fairs, a contribution which takes the 
form of an objective social science. 
"These two great discoveries, the ma-
terialistic conception of history, and the 
capitalistic production through surplus 
value, we owe to Marx. With these dis-
coveries socialism becomes a science."5 
Modern physical science is the major 
source of inspiration for behaviorism. 
Its advocates point to the advances in 
the physical sciences and claim that its 
method applied to human behavior can 
yield similar progress. Concomitant with 
this desire to emulate the methods of 
the physical sciences is a rejection of 
psychology prior to behaviorism as be-
ing laden with vague metaphysical 
terminology. I refer to B. F. Skinner's 
book, Behavior of Organisms, 1938. In 
this work Skinner registers his dissatis-
faction with the progress of psychology. 
Riddled with imprecise and subjective 
terminology, dominated by burden-
some theoretical constructions, psychol-
ogy for Skinner requires a method 
which is free from obscurantist and in-
trospective accounts of human be-
havior. 
There is a striking parallel between 
Skinner's concept of the efficiency and 
economy of his method and Marx's 
view of his own method. Both are con-
cerned to rid their inquiries of excess 
speculative, theoretical baggage. In the 
German Ideology Marx makes this 
claim the premise of the materialist 
conception of history: 
The premises from which we begin are not 
arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real prem-
ises from which abstractions can only be 
made in the imagination. They are the real 
individuals, their activity and the material 
conditions of their life, both those which 
they find already existing and those by 
their activity. These premises can thus be 
verified in a purely empirical way.6 
Skinner in his description of the in-
ception of modern behavioral science 
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sees its advance as contingent upon its 
ability to displace methods which re-
sort to explaining behavior by some 
cause or process anterior to behavior. 
"When a science of behavior had once 
rid itself of psychic fictions: either it 
might leave their places empty and 
proceed to deal with its data directly, 
or it might make replacements,"7 Em-
pirical data is Skinner's tool. ''There 
is only one way to obtain a convenient 
and useful system and that is to go di-
rectly to the data."8 
Both Marx and Skinner are striving 
for an objective approach to their re-
spective subject matters in order to 
yield empirically verifiable laws which 
can be used to predict and control the 
course of human affairs. They take 
positions of primary materialism, that 
is, they reject any attempt to account 
for any human phenomenon by ap-
pealing to any concept of mind. Marx's 
dialectical materialism replaces German 
metaphysical idealism, Skinner's scien-
tific materialism replaces the mind-mat-
ter dualism presupposed by such prom-
inent predecessors as Freud and James. 
In both Marxism and behaviorism 
man's role becomes that of interpreter 
of the forces that shape him. This is 
accomplished by analyzing the dispo-
sition and dynamics of material forces. 
For Skinner: "The task of a scientific 
analysis is to explain how the behavior 
of a person as a physical system is re-
lated to conditions under which this in-
dividual lives."9 For Marx: "The first 
premise of all human history is, of 
course, the existence of living human 
individuals. Thus the first fact to be 
established is the physical organization 
of these individuals and their conse-
quent relation to the rest of nature."10 
These two quotes illustrate a similar-
ity in what Marx and Skinner conceive 
to be the object and purpose of their 
study. Both men consider themselves 
as scientists, as objective interpreters 
of the natural order, eschewing mysti-
fication of man's relation to nature. 
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This view, however, has a significant 
political implication. Scientific under-
standing provides the possibility of pre-
diction and control and thus leads to a 
technology of human affairs. This tech-
nology in Marxist terms is a revolution-
ary activity, in Skinnerian terms a be-
havioral technology. The scientific ob-
jective detachment of Marx and Skin-
ner is linked to social-political com-
mitment. Indeed, the social goals are 
the ultimate justifications for both sys-
tems. 
To conclude: there are three factors 
which inhere in Marxism and behavior-
ism which makes the systems parallel 
in their claims for scientific objectivity. 
First, both view their methods as being 
scientific, dealing with strict empirical 
data and shunning speculation. Second, 
they both see man as an interperter of 
himself as a strict physical-material en-
tity: and third, they both view their 
systems as alternatives to outmoded 
and benighted idealistic or mentalistic 
conceptual schemes. 
II 
In the first section I mentioned the 
technological implications of the two 
systems as being the most effective in-
struments of social change. The im-
petus here is a kind of moral-social 
idealism, a realization of the vast dis-
parity between man as he is and man 
as he could be, and a revulsion from 
the spectacle of human destructiveness 
and the institutionalization of greed 
and exploitation. 
Genuine knowledge provides man 
the opportunity to divest himself of 
the ugly and brutal conditions which 
have so long determined the lives of 
so many. Marxism and behaviorism are 
prescriptive in disposition. Both claim 
an absolute right to be believed, that 
is, they both see their programs as 
being absolutely essential in order to 
bring about an improved social order 
and they both see their detractors as 
obscurantists or sentimentalists. Skin-
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ner's view is that the development of 
"behavioral technology" is the best 
guarantee of avoiding massive social 
upheaval: 
A behavioral technology comparable in 
power and precision to physical and bio-
logical technology is lacking, and those 
who do not find the possibility ridiculous 
are more likely to be frightened by it than 
reassured. That is how far we are from 
preventing the catastrophe toward which 
the world seems to be inexorably moving.11 
Marx is not quite as gloomv. He doesn't 
see the world as moving inexplorably 
toward catastrophe, yet in his own time 
he foresaw a massive class struggle, 
one in which the proletariat, the ex-
ploited class of propertyless laborers 
would seize social power from the 
propertied capitalist exploiters.12 Marx's 
view of history is pervaded with moral 
indignation. In his Economic and Philo-
sophic Manuscripts Marx describes the 
social and economic conditions which 
lead to the dehumanization of working 
class people. His work is not only a 
critical social analysis but is also a moral 
indictment of a social system which 
he believes is based upon ruthless ex-
ploitation and greed. 
The implicit moral idealism in Marx-
ism and behaviorism identifies the 
causes of social evil as being due to ex-
ternal environmental imbalances which 
are aggravated by man's own ignorance 
of their existence and perpetuated by 
his misconception of himself as a self-
determined agent of social change. 
Once however, he has perfected the 
tools of social analysis and developed 
a human engineering science, the con-
ditions which threaten his well-being 
can be eliminated. With Marx, for ex-
ample, a reorganization of the means 
of production brings this about: 
With the seizing of the means of produc-
tion by society, production of commodities 
is done away with, and simultaneously, the 
master of product over producer . . . then 
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for the first time man, in a certain sense is 
finally marked off from the rest of the 
animal kingdom and emerges from mere 
animal conditions into really human ones.13 
This kind of human ideal described 
above by Engels is to a large extent 
shaped by the concept of human per-
fectability. Human perfeetability is, of 
course, one of the overriding themes 
of the Enlightenment. "Our hopes for 
the future condition of the human race 
can be subsumed under three impor-
tant heads; the abolition of inequality 
between nations, the progress of equal-
ity within each nation, and the true 
perfection of mankind."14 
Marx grew up very much under the 
influence of Enlightenment ideals.15 He 
inherited the optimistic view of eight-
eenth century thinkers such as Con-
dorcet who believed that the gradual 
advance of the human mind by means 
of science and art over superstition 
and ignorance would eventually liber-
ate the human race from the evils of 
tyranny, injustice and war. This view, 
which essentially equated vice with ig-
norance, exalted the capabilities of the 
mind and interpreted moral social evils 
to be temporary obstructions which 
would yield to the forces of scientific 
advancement. Marx's social analysis 
produces a more insightful and realistic 
explanation of social change. He is 
aware of the non-rational economic 
and political forces which create in-
equities and of the pressures and ten-
sions which arise when various groups 
compete for social and economic pow-
er. Yet he shares with Enlightenment 
thinkers the optimism of the outcome 
of this competition. His belief is that 
man can extend his mastery of the 
natural physical world to his own so-
cial world and in effect liberate himself 
from all the evils which have frustrated 
the complete realization of his human-
ity-
Skinner's views are also much ef-
fected by the concept of human per-
fectability. The very title of his book 
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Beyond Freedom and Dignity is a re-
flection of his view that concepts such 
as freedom and dignity are vestiges of 
a false and metaphysical view of hu-
man autonomy, a view he believes frus-
trates attempts to implement methods 
and practices by which men can rid 
themselves of social evils. "A scientific 
analysis of behavior dispossesses auton-
omous man and turns the control he 
has said to exert over to the environ-
ment."16 Once man abandons his tena-
cious but misguided commitment to 
the illusion of his autonomy he gains 
a previously unparalleled dimension of 
control over his own activity, a control 
which enables him to eradicate the 
sources of social evil. Indeed it is the 
concept of morality itself which has 
impeded the process of human per-
fection because the institution of moral-
ity presupposes a degree of personal 
responsibility and individual autonomy, 
a false presupposition which, for Skin-
ner, results in a failure to examine and 
understand the true causes of human 
behavior and consequently results in a 
failure to remedy basic human mala-
dies. Skinner's ultimate purpose in this 
respect is to formulate all human prob-
lems into technological problems. Then 
man can establish a process of identi-
fying causal relations of human be-
havior to antisocial and destructive ac-
tivities and a technique of adjusting 
those causes to obtain an extinction of 
the unwanted behavior. The domain of 
human affairs which has been tradition-
ally considered ethical is thus trans-
formed into a strict scientific one and 
thus man, in effect, delivers himself 
without obstacle to his own scrutiny, 
which is capable of identifying and 
eliminating his own imperfections. 
Skinner's proposed transformation of 
morality into technology is very much 
analogous to Marx's vision of the with-
ering away of the state once the pro-
ductive capacities of society have been 
transformed. Implicit in both views is 
the idea that the greatest human goods 
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will be realized when man acknowl-
edges his being acted upon and shaped 
by the material world and also acknowl-
edges that by rearranging material con-
ditions (for Marx, the termination of 
commodity production, for Skinner, a 
more consistent system of distributing 
pleasure and pain) a better world will 
come into existence. 
To conclude: both Marxism and be-
haviorism envision an improved society 
which can be realized once man recog-
nizes his stature as a material being, 
determined by the same processes that 
shape the rest of the world; and sub-
jects his social world to an administra-
tion which reorders existing institutions 
and implements programs in light of 
man's material determination by natural 
laws. In effect, both Marxism and be-
haviorism offer man the opportunity 
to perfect himself, to realize his posi-
tive potentialities in a society which 
has effectively eradicated the unwant-
ed and unwholesome side of his nature. 
III 
Marxism and behaviorism are theo-
ries of human nature. But unlike some 
theories of human nature, for example, 
stoicism, Thomism, or psychoanalysis, 
both Marxism and behaviorism require 
a social-political implementation of 
their theories. In order for there to be 
a better world, a socialist economic 
order, or a behaviorist technocracy 
must be brought into existence. In both 
cases there is the assumption that the 
quality of human social experience will 
be significantly improved because social 
institutions will be based on the recog-
nition and satisfaction of genuine hu-
man needs and these institutions will 
be more knowledgeably and efficiently 
administered. For Marx, the new so-
ciety eliminates the institution of pri-
vate property, an institution he believes 
is responsible for creating dehumanized 
social relations. Its existence requires 
that persons treat each other as objects, 




Private property has made us so stupid 
and one sided that an object is only ours 
when we have it, when it exists for us as 
capital or when we directly possess, eat, 
drink, wear, inhabit it, etc., in short when 
we use it.17 
Private property extends the concept 
and practice of "using" to the ultimate 
sphere of human relations so that men 
cease to exist as creatures with any gen-
uine content or value in themselves. 
Marx believes that if a society can be 
created in which the goal of "possessing 
things" can be eliminated then people 
will treat each other in an intelligent, 
compassionate, and humane way in-
stead of exploiting and degrading one 
another. 
Skinner's program for improving the 
quality of social experience involves the 
design of a science of human behavior. 
Advances in this science mean that so-
cial affairs can be subject to a much 
greater degree of rational management 
and control. When the power to pre-
dict and control is substantial and well 
organized then undesirable and destruc-
tive elements can be eliminated. In his 
book Science and Human Behavior 
Skinner proposes that the experimental 
method of the physical sciences be ex-
tended to the domain of human soci-
ety. In fact he sees society itself as a 
type of experiment. "A given culture 
is, in short, an experiment in be-
havior."18 Society is analogously, a lab-
oratory in which the institutions are 
designed to elicit the kind of social 
behavior that advances the standing of 
the institution. Skinner defines govern-
ment as, "the power to punish" and 
law as, "statement of contingency rein-
forcement."19 Government and its con-
stituent agencies thus secure compli-
ance to their rules by administering a 
very complex system of punishments 
and rewards. Thus the situation be-
comes one in which institutions are 
highly successful in realizing their ends, 
unlike our present situation, in which 
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our institutions are at best meager, 
provisional successes, and at worst dis-
mal unmitigated failures. 
The widespread utilization of a sci-
ence of human behavior by a society, 
claims Skinner, greatly increases the 
likelihood that its various social en-
deavors will be much more successful. 
What exactly is his measure of suc-
cess? The successful realization of in-
stitutional goals. But what about more 
general, intangible goals? Skinner's 
general standard of success is survival. 
He draws a cultural analogy to physical 
evolution. Social practices which sur-
vive are evidence of success. "A scien-
tific analysis may lead us to resist the 
more immediate blandishments of free-
dom, justice, knowledge or happiness 
in considering the long run conse-
quences of survival."20 One can't help 
but wonder what interest a society 
would have in surviving without these 
"blandishments." 
The aim of both Skinner and Marx 
is the institution of a society relatively 
free of exploitation and destructiveness, 
and absolutely committed to creative 
and cooperative endeavors. Both, how-
ever, share what I believe is a con-
ceptual flaw which permits their genu-
inely useful insights to be contaminated 
by substantial dogmatism. The flaw, I 
think, lies in their mutual disparage-
ment of the theoretical dimension of 
intellectual activity. With Marx this 
disparagement manifests itself in a re-
pudiation of philosophy itself. His re-
jection of philosophy, particularly Ger-
man philosophy, arose from his convic-
tion that its preoccupation with ideas 
betrayed commitment to the problems 
of the material world. 
Since the Young Hegelians consider con-
ceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the 
products of consciousness, to which they 
attribute an independent existence, as the 
real chains of men (just as the Old Hege-
lians declare them the true bonds of hu-
man society), it is evident that the Young 
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Hegelians have to fight only against these 
illusions of consciousness . . . they forget, 
however, that they themselves are opposing 
nothing but phrases to these phrases, and 
that they are in no way combating the real 
existing world when they are combating 
solely the phrases of this world.21 
Skinner's opposition to theory takes 
form in his delineation of the pro-
cedure of scientific explanation. His 
aim is to formulate scientific explana-
tion so that it is free from terms which 
cannot be operationally defined. The-
ory, for Skinner, means a set of law-
fully connected statements and not an 
abstracted conceptual construction. "He 
(Skinner) criticizes the construction, in 
psychological theories, of causal chains 
in which a first link consisting of an ob-
servable and controllable event is con-
nected with a final ('third') one of the 
same kind by an intermediate link which 
usually is not open to observation and 
control."22 A scientifically constructed 
explanation of a given phenomena thus 
ought to utilize terms which can be 
translated into direct observational data. 
"A reflex is not, of course, a theory. 
It is a fact. It is an analytical unit 
which makes an investigation of be-
havior possible."23 The methodological 
goal is reduction. The further an ex-
planation is from expression in sensory 
units the more likely it is to be laden 
with terms representing entities, quali-
ties or relations which can neither be 
measured nor confirmed and thus the 
explanation becomes an abstraction 
from real analyzable quantities into less 
real unanalyzable qualities. 
One of the weaknesses of this view 
is the fact that it easily degenerates 
into an overly mechanistic construc-
tion which fails to account for the crea-
tive and innovative aspects of human 
experience. Theoretical constructions 
serve as tools, as instruments to gener-
ate new interpretations of factual data. 
For Skinner it is as though raw sense 
data is simply there for the asking and 
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the major problem is to break it into 
simple, manageable, and measurable 
analytic units. These analytic units be-
come the clear unquestionable build-
ing blocks of scientific explanation. 
Theory then is superfluous and adds 
only what must ultimately be discarded. 
This is the point where Skinner's 
work is most vulnerable to ideological 
degeneration. The reaction against the-
ory and against speculation and imag-
ination and the exaltation of practice 
over theory, grossly inhibits the influx 
of new ideas. That raw sense data sup-
plies certainty is a philosophical asser-
tion that involves a number of difficult 
and complex epistemological and meta-
psychological problems such as the on-
tological status of perceptions and their 
determination in time and space. To 
downgrade the role of theory in scien-
tific explanations is to deprive the enter-
prise of opportunities for growth and 
development. Theory is needed for new 
and imaginative systematization of data, 
and the offering of fertile hypothesis 
which suggest new interpretations. 
"Theoretical terms cannot be replaced 
without serious loss by formulations in 
terms of observables only."24 
The parallel between Marx's dispar-
agement of philosophy and Skinner's 
rejection of theoretical constructs points 
to a similar ontological view that re-
ality is ultimately material, and that 
thought itself is a material activity. 
Thus it is matter and not ideas which 
determines the content and direction 
of human endeavor. Since it is matter 
which determines ideas and not the 
reverse, the political implication is that 
society should structure its institutions 
so that the people are related to the 
material world in a way which satisfies 
basic needs and impulses. And since 
ideas are the outcome of this system, 
there is a tendency to measure them 
as consistent or inconsistent with the 
social design. Those ideas which con-
tradict the ends of the system are con-
7 
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sidered to be not only false, but per- spective conceptions of the relation of 
nicious and destructive. Truth then, the mind and thought to the other 
becomes a standard of ideological pu- aspects of human experience, a moral-
rity and the intellectual virtues of hon- ism which takes it justification by the 
esty, clarity and creativity are over- contention that human society is per-
riden by the social requirements of loy- fectible and that the readjustment of 
alty and conformity. Thus, as I stated social institutions will bring about this 
at the beginning of this paper, Marx- perfection by eliminating destructive-
ism and behaviorism are dominated by ness and exploitation, 
a moralism that arises out of their re-
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